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Abstract— This paper presents the first generalized reputation 
system that can be applied to multiple networks that is based on 
the blockchain. We first discuss current reputation systems, 
conducting a critical analysis of their current security 
vulnerabilities, before looking at how new blockchain based 
technologies are used. We propose an innovative new reputation 
system that is based on blockchain technologies which aims to 
solve many unanswered questions in today’s current generation 
reputation systems. We then consider the limitations of such a 
system, before using simulations and analyses to demonstrate 
methods of overcoming these limitations. We conclude by 
suggesting areas for future studies, and summarizing our findings. 
Blockchain, reputation systems, cryptographic protocols, 
distrubted networks, peer-to-peer, Bittorent 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reputation measures how much the community trusts you, 
and is calculated on your previous transactions and interactions 
with the community. The greater your reputation, the more 
trustworthy you are seen to be on the network and, with a user’s 
reputation on the line, users choose to behave more honestly on 
the network [1]. 
At present, eBay has the most widely used reputation system 
and processes over a billion transactions per day [2]. Each 
transaction could result in two reputation scores being left (one 
from the buyer, the other from the seller); it is therefore 
essential that reputation systems can handle a large number of 
transactions, and have adequate sources to handle this level of 
data.  
E-commerce reputation systems often implement multi-
dimensional reputations, which allow the user to rate the seller 
on a range of factors such as postage cost and quality of 
communications. All major E-commerce websites use the 
traditional client-server model, where the reputation data is 
centrally stored, calculated and distributed on a centralized 
server and all clients can request to see this data from the central 
server.  
In eBay’s system, the positive feedback percentage is 
calculated based on the total number of positive and negative 
feedback ratings for transactions in the last 12 months, 
excluding repeat feedback from the same member for purchases 
made within the same calendar week [3]. 
The reputation score is calculated centrally by the E-
commerce website, which has the negative effect of the 
company being able to change the reputation calculation 
algorithm and force the deployment of this to all users without 
their knowledge.  For example, eBay recently prevented sellers 
from leaving negative feedback about buyers. 
Although successful reputation systems have been 
implemented on multiple web services, they are all based on the 
centralised server model which makes them unsuitable for 
deployment in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, where the 
principle purpose is decentralisation of control away from a 
single entitle.  Thus far, the effective communication and 
sharing of unmodified information relating to trust and 
reputation remains an unsolved issue [4].  
There are several reputation systems implemented in peer-
to-peer networks, which aim to provide users of the network 
with an incentive to behave honestly and to deter “freeloaders” 
for example, on the Gnutella network - the most popular P2P 
network - an estimated 70% of all peers behave in such a way 
[5]. Freeloaders are peers who download content from the 
network, but who do not distribute any content.  
There are various implementations of reputation systems on 
peer-to-peer networks; some require the implementation of a 
trusted central server, much like the E-commerce model, which 
records and calculates all users’ ratings, whilst other systems 
try to distribute the reputation system with a distributed 
database that all peers on the network have an updated copy of. 
The final implementation of reputation systems on a P2P 
network only records reputation of peers it has interacted with. 
Unlike E-commerce reputation systems where participation 
is mandatory, enrolment in a P2P reputation system is optional 
and many nodes are concerned about the loss of privacy or the 
additional resources that are required. 
P2P reputation systems are single-dimensional systems, 
with each peer only leaving one bit of data about the transaction 
that has taken place; this enhances efficiency and also reduces 
load on the network. 
The calculation of reputation differs from implementation 
to implementation, however the general calculation method for 
each peer is that their reputation is the sum of all reputation 
feedback received. 
All reputation systems, no matter how they are deployed or 
what type of network they are deployed over, face the same 
fundamental issues. The ability to link an identity to a single 
user, and to prevent that user from obtaining more than one 
identity, is key to preventing a user exploiting the system by 
creating multiple identities and transacting between them. 
Another limitation that is central to all reputation systems 
and which remains an open question is how to quantify 
reputation? Furthermore, how can we ensure the reputation left 
by a user is accurate and is based on a real transaction? 
This paper is organised as follows: section two describes 
related work in this area, focusing on reputation systems 
implemented in peer-to-peer systems. Section three discusses 
our proposed reputation system along with some of the 
technologies used in it, whilst section four summarises our 
approach with simulation and comparison of our network 
compared to currently implemented reputation systems, before 
concluding with suggestions for future work and summarising 
the contribution of this paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Existing “decentralized” reputation systems 
Peer-to-peer based reputation systems have been around 
almost as long as peer-to-peer networks themselves, with the 
first system mentioned in literature in 2003 [6]. Reputation 
systems on peer-to-peer networks all have different goals; from 
choosing reliable resources, ensuring peers behave honestly, 
and rating the quality of content of a shared file.  
Reputation systems in peer-to-peer networks have to 
contend with the known issues of reputation systems in general, 
with the additional complexity a peer-to-peer network adds. 
Additional issues, such as how to keep data up to date, accurate 
and distributed to a large set of peers which changes 
dynamically are faced when deploying a reputation system over 
a P2P network [7]. 
Wang proposes a reputation system based on the Bayesian 
model, which aims to rate file shares based on the quality of the 
file they are sharing, as well as the trust in each peer [8]. This 
is a novel system, separating trust and reputation, whereas 
previous systems tend to combine these into a single rating [9]. 
The separation of these ratings allows for all users to gain a trust 
rating by acting honestly on the network. However, one key 
issue with Wang’s model is that they assume all users are honest 
in their ratings of each peer, which is an unlikely occurrence in 
the real world. The system does not try to provide each user 
with a global view of the network, instead reputations are 
collected by each peer based on previous transactions. The 
reputation and trust is based on a binary system, and for each 
successful transaction a reputation score of 1 is given. The trust 
and reputation scores are the sum of all scores. Several issues 
with this type of reputation exist, the assumption that all scores 
are genuine for a transaction that actually took place and that 
there are no malicious actors trying to profit from the system is 
perhaps the most major one. The reputation scores and 
calculation done by each peer is however a good workaround to 
the known issue of distributing data to all nodes in the network; 
Makan argues that repeated communication between peers at 
separate times is unlikely to occur, rendering this type of 
reputation system useless [10]. 
Gupta et al. [5] take a radically different approach to Wang. 
Instead of localized reputations, they implement a centralized 
server model on a P2P network. This implementation does not 
require all nodes in the network to use the reputation service. 
The centralization of the stored reputation is an effective way 
of ensuring all users can gain access to up to date reputation 
data, solving the client synchronization issue of distributing this 
data across nodes. However, this model once again assumes 
there to be no malicious actors in the network. Like Wang this 
model uses a binary scoring system and the reputation score is 
just the sum of reputations received for each peer. It is assumed 
that a negative reputation would not be transmitted. One 
innovative system in this implementation to prove a peer sent a 
piece of data is the creation of a receipt. A piece of data 
containing the file name, identities, etc. of both the parties 
involved is generated and signed by both parties’ private keys, 
this is then sent to the central authority who can award 
reputation to both users. This would allow a multidimensional 
reputation system where a user can be rated on their actions on 
individual files. 
Both of the systems proposed by Wang and Gupta fail to 
address both the issue of identity management – to ensure users 
can only obtain a single identity - and the possibility that peers 
may collude together in order to profit from the system to 
increase their own reputations. 
B. Attacks on decentralised reputation systems 
Attacking a reputation system can lead to significant 
benefits for an attacker. On an Ecommerce website, a user with 
high reputation can expect to receive an 11.2% premium on all 
goods they sell, which provides a motive for attack. 
Perhaps the most challenging attack to prove and prevent is 
the unfair ratings attack. In this attack, an attacker provides 
ratings that do not reflect their genuine opinion of the rater in 
an attempt to lower the peer’s reputation. Jøsang and Golbeck 
describe a possible defense against such an attack by comparing 
ratings of users to ratings left by higher trusted users on the 
network [11]. However, they fail to consider an attack first 
described by Lou whereby the peer is selectively malicious 
[12]; their proposed defense being that this type of attack would 
go undetected, and potentially penalize the honest node instead. 
This is an attack that has been conducted by GCHQ in an 
attempt to discredit selected targets [13]. 
Collusion is another popular attack that is common in 
reputation systems. This attack is based on a group of nodes 
who collude between each other with the aim of lowering a 
target node’s reputation. One solution against an ongoing 
colluding attack is to calculate the reputation score based on the 
average of all reputations received from a peer. 
The collusion attack is often deployed in conjunction with 
the Sybil attack. The Sybil attack is where a single user gains 
access to multiple legal identities. While Jøsang and Golbeck 
do not describe any countermeasures [11], Douceur describes 
how the success of a Sybil attack depends on the cost of 
obtaining an identity [14], and clearly shows how the 
effectiveness of a Sybil attack is reduced when the cost of 
generating a new identity increases. The most effective 
countermeasure is to link the identity to a real world identity, as 
described by Yu et al [15]. However, the disadvantage of such 
a countermeasure is while this all but prevents a Sybil attack, it 
makes entrance to the network expensive for the network, due 
to the resources required to verify every user, a solution that 
would not scale well. 
The re-entry attack also exploits the cost of entry to a 
network. With this attack, an attacker can choose to behave 
maliciously; once they have a low reputation that impacts their 
attack, they stop using that account and generate a new account 
and use this, this method is constantly repeated. Prêtre rightly 
appraises this attack as efficient not only because of the low cost 
of entry to the network, but the network sees a user with zero 
reputation scores as higher than a user with negative scores, 
providing the user with an incentive to dispose of the account 
[16]. 
While the majority of reputation systems currently deployed 
are vulnerable to these - and more - attacks, Jøsang and Golbeck 
question whether it is necessary for the reputation system to be 
perfectly secure [11]. They argue that, in the majority of 
situations, there is little incentive to attack the network, and the 
value of a reputation system lies elsewhere. 
III. OUR APPROACH 
We propose a general blockchain based reputation system 
that aims to solve several major challenges that the previous 
generations of reputation systems have failed to resolve, as well 
as preventing attacks that are possible on current generation 
reputation systems. We will focus on the application of this 
system on a peer-to-peer network, although it is also just as 
easily deployed on a classic E-commerce website. 
Blockchain technology is a novel peer-to-peer approach to 
linking a sequence of transactions or events together in a way 
that makes them immutable.  This was originally described by 
Nakamoto and implemented for the virtual currency Bitcoin 
[17].  In Bitcoin, users exchange money using transactions 
much like in real life.   When a user creates a transaction he 
broadcasts this to all peers in the network.  A special group of 
peers, called miners, collect broadcast transactions and attempt 
to incorporate them into a block that satisfies a cryptographic 
hash function.  The process of producing a block is 
computationally intensive and probabilistic.  Given a proposed 
block, each miner has a fixed and independent probability of 
successfully producing a block which satisfies the hash function 
for each unit of computation time.  Whilst producing a block is 
hard, verification of a correct block is not. 
Blocks are also linked together by chaining the hash of the 
previous block with each subsequent one.  Thus, an attacker 
must control a significantly proportion of the computation 
power (typically 51%) to produce one false block and faking 
transactions back into the past is exponentially hard. 
The collection of blocks (and their transactions) is called the 
ledger in Bitcoin and is publically inspectable by any peer.  
Thus a peer can see and verify any transaction from any point 
in time. 
The blockchain was first described by Nakamoto in his paper 
describing the Bitcoin protocol [17]. The blockchain is a public 
leger of all transactions that have ever been completed since the 
first “genesis” block. Each transaction from the Bitcoin 
protocol is broadcast to all nodes in the network which are 
maintaining the blockchain, known as miners.  
These miners check the transactions were valid (e.g., sender 
has enough coins to send) and then package all the valid 
transactions into a block. All nodes have a complete copy of the 
blockchain and keep this up to date. The block must contain a 
cryptographic hash of the previous block, this is the method 
used to cryptographically link every block in the blockchain to 
its previous block, all the way back to the first, genesis block. 
Once the block has been assembled, all miners on the network 
undertake a challenge of finding a nonce, so that the hash of the 
current block contains a set amount of zeros at the start. This 
process is commonly referred to as mining. Mining is a 
competition between all miners on the network, and the first 
miner to find the nonce and publish this confirmed block to the 
network receives a set amount of Bitcoins.  
The use of previous hashes in each block prevents any attack 
where the contents of a block is changed, as if this were to 
happen that block and all subsequent blocks hashes would not 
match up. The only method a user would be able to use to 
change data in a previous block is to control 51% of all 
computational power on the network. Known as the 51% attack, 
this attack requires a majority of the computational power to be 
used to “re-mine” each block from the block that was altered. 
This would require a substantial amount of computing power, 
as the Bitcoin network currently has 510,000,000 GH/S [18] of 
computational power solely dedicated to mining, which is 256 
times more powerful than the combination of the top 500 
supercomputers in the world [19]. 
It is this property that makes the blockchain into a very 
secure ledger, which will remain secure to all adversaries who 
control less than 51% of the computational power of the 
network, as the cost of resources required to control 51% would 
outweigh the potential rewards. 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF OUR APPROACH 
We propose a new reputation system based on the 
blockchain technology. To reduce load on the current Bitcoin 
blockchain and to reduce inflation of the blockchain, we will 
create an entirely new blockchain, the sole purpose of which is 
to store reputation from completed transactions.  
The proposed network has two goals – to withstand 
previously documented attacks on reputation systems and to 
provide a generalised reputation system that can be 
implemented into any network. 
In a peer-to-peer network environment, we propose to solve 
the issue of quantifying reputation by removing the human 
opinion from the transaction. Our system will only store single 
dimensional reputation, with each user leaving either a 1 for a 
positive transaction, or a 0 for a non-satisfactory transaction. A 
positive transaction is classified as a transaction in which the 
user received the file they requested.  
We classify a transaction as the sending a piece of data, such 
as a file, signed by the sender’s private key to a user who 
requested it. 
Upon receiving the correct file, the user sends a transaction 
consisting of the reputation score, a timestamp, and a hash of 
the received file. This data is then encrypted with the receiver’s 
private key and is sent to the miners. This ensures the reputation 
left by a user is based on a real transaction, a major issue in 
current generation reputation systems. The unfair ratings attack 
is now no longer possible since there is now cryptographic 
proof the user sent a requested file, and the user received it. 
 Fig 1 is a diagram of the format of a transaction which 
would be sent to the miners 
The miners check the validity of the transaction by 
contacting each user involved in the transaction, and requests a 
signed proof, containing the file hash and a random nonce sent 
by the miner to be included. This is to prove each user 
sent/received the file, however this does have the drawback of 
requiring the users to still be online, for the miners to verify the 
transaction. The miners then assemble these verified 
transactions into a block of other transactions before confirming 
them in a method identical to current Bitcoin implementation. 
Fig 2 shows some pseudo code detailing how a miner would 
verify a transaction. 
A method to ensure users cannot generate multiple identities 
cheaply is to link the indemnity creation to the IP address of a 
user. IPV4 addresses are becoming more expensive to purchase, 
as there is a lack of them available. While this method does not 
prevent an attacker from creating multiple identities, it makes 
the cost of doing so much more expensive, thus deterring all but 
the most well-funded attacker.  
Identity based encryption systems with the ability to 
generate a public key based on an email address were also 
evaluated and tested; this was a desirable feature, however the 
requirement of a centralized server to generate all public/private 
keys made this option unsuitable for our system. 
The ability to prevent multiple identities from a single 
machine, is key in preventing a Sybil attack, this combined with 
the expensive cost of entrance [20] to our network, makes it 
unviable for all but the most powerful adversary to conduct a 
Sybil attack on the network. To adapt this system for an E-
commerce network, the data sent to the miners would be the 
Bitcoin transaction hash, the public key of the sender of the item 
and the public key of the receiver.  
To reduce malicious transactions on the network, we also 
propose a proof-of-stake system, where a user with a low, or no, 
reputation stakes a small amount of currency (Bitcoins) into a 
triple signed wallet. A triple signed wallet is a wallet created 
with three sets of keys, one from the sender, one from the 
receiver and one from an impartial third party. When a low-
reputation user wants to share a file, they demonstrate they are 
honest by sending a small amount of currency to the wallet set 
up especially for this transaction; this would mean if the user 
were to behave dishonestly and send a malicious file, the 
amount stored in the wallet would be sent to a pool which the 
network uses to act as a reward for miners finding blocks. This 
is chosen to discourage any user from trying to profit from this 
feature. If the transaction were to be conducted honestly, the 
file sender would receive the amount they staked back. 
To ensure this network cannot be affected by a 51% attack 
in the early days of deployment we utilize the power of the 
Bitcoin network by using merge mining. Merge mining allows 
all miners on the Bitcoin network to use their hashing power on 
our reputation system. This does not reduce the hashing power 
of the Bitcoin network, but does increase the total hashing 
power of the reputation and thus the security of the reputation 
system, as now to conduct the 51% an attacker would need to 
control the majority of computing power of both the Bitcoin and 
reputation network. 
As well as the distributed blockchain, which ensures every 
peer has a full copy of the blockchain, eliminating client 
synchronisation issues as faced on previous distributed 
reputation systems, we also use the “friend peer reputation” 
model. As well as publishing all reputation about transactions 
onto the blockchain, the client also stores reputation from peers 
it has had previous interactions with. This can be multi-
dimensional reputation, such as speed of the transaction, quality 
of file, etc. This information is not published to the blockchain 
as it would increase the cost of storage required per transaction 
and more importantly it is subjective from a user’s perspective. 
The final component of our reputation system is how to 
calculate reputation score of each peer. Reputation scores are 
not published on the blockchain. Unlike most previous 
generation reputation systems where the reputation client is 
community controlled, our proposed reputation system is client 
controlled. The client can calculate the reputation score based 
on parameters set by them. For example, a user could only view 
reputations from users on a specific network. To prevent against 
the collusion attack, where multiple users trade between 
Miner Verification 
 
For each transaction 
 Connect (tx, ip) 
 Send (random nonce) 
Response      receive  
Verify (response, tx, nonce) 
 Add to block mining queue () 
Figure 2: Pseudo code for miner verification of a transaction 
Private 
key of 
sender 
Private key 
of receiver 
File requested 
Timestamp 
Hash of file 
Timestamp  
Reputation score 
Hash of file received 
Figure 1: Receipt of transaction sent to the miners 
themselves multiple times in order to unfairly gain reputation, 
each user will only be given a reputation score based on the 
average of all their reputation score. This ensures if two nodes 
are transacting together, they will get the same reputation scores 
whether they send one transaction or a thousand transactions to 
each other. 
For the network to have the property of temporal 
adaptability the client could only rate users from reputation over 
a short period of time. Josang et al. [21] demonstrate a user’s 
behaviour in the last few days is a more accurate indicator of 
the user’s future behaviour than analysing all previous 
behaviour on the network. 
To select a user, they wish to download a file from, for 
example, a user finds all the peers which are hosting the file, the 
client then calculates the reputation for each peer using data 
from the blockchain and also using the friend peer reputation 
data to calculate a list a of the most reputable peers. Only 
requiring the client to calculate reputation of a small subset of 
peers reduces the computational resources required by the 
client. Once the user has calculated the most reputable client 
they can initialize the download. This method of peer selection 
can be used for E-commerce and other type of networks. 
V. LIMITATIONS, ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS 
As with any network there are some limitations in the 
deployment and use of this network. The majority of the 
limitations we faced were due to fundamental flaws in the 
architecture of the blockchain protocol 
Unlike the majority of peer-to-peer networks, where network 
growth is uncapped, and will continue to grow as long as new 
nodes join and stay in the network, a blockchain based network 
has a hard limit on the number of transactions that can be 
processed per second. EBay currently process on average 
23,148 reputation transactions a second, however due to 
requirement of a block being mined every ten minutes, and a 
maximum block size, our network would only be able to 
process 10 transactions a second. This is a significant reduction 
in the transactions our proposed network is able to process a 
second compared to a more traditional, previous-generation 
reputation system.  
If the network were to receive more than 10 transactions a 
second, the miners would be forced to queue the reputation 
scores which would be included in a later block. This is not just 
an inconvenience to users who are relying on the network, it 
could also open the door for a denial of service where malicious 
colluding nodes would spam the miners with transactions, 
forcing miners to conduct computationally expensive 
verification of these transactions and forcing genuine users’ 
transactions to be queued and delayed.  
The “hard limit” on the number of transactions that can be 
processed a second also limits growth of the network and could 
render this application useless for some scenarios.  
We will look at solutions to this problem later on in this 
section. 
Another limitation on how effective and successful the 
reputation system is to be is the global deployment and 
adoption.  
Currently, in addition to the issues mentioned above, other 
issues stopping this network from being deployed and 
implemented on a large scale is that the required resources on 
each node make this expensive to implement, with the proposed 
1MB block size, (the same as the Bitcoin network) the 
blockchain could increase at a rate of 144MB a day (53GB a 
year).  
These properties make it unlikely that a network with a high 
amount of low resourced users, such as mobile users, would 
implement this reputation system. This is a critical part of the 
success of the reputation system 
It would take several months from deployment for the 
reputation system to become effective, gaining the necessary 
data and feedback from users that would allow other users on 
the network to make informed decisions on the trustworthiness 
of a peer. It would therefore take several months from 
deployment before the full potential of this reputation system 
would be noticed. 
While we have proposed a system that solves a number of 
known issues with current generation reputation systems, and 
which secures them using cryptographic functions, the risk of 
unknown technical flaws in the cryptography used could 
undermine security on the network. 
The final limitation of the proposed network is un-
defendable attacks, such as an intelligent colluding attack. 
While we have proposed countermeasures for such an attack, it 
might still be possible for an attacker to profit from the system. 
The impact of such an attack should be low, and with all the 
aforementioned countermeasures implemented such an attack 
would be very expensive to conduct, but we will never be able 
to defend against all possible attacks with 100% success rate. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF LIMTAITONS 
In the section we will conduct analysis of various methods to 
reduce the limitations of the network through simulations and 
calculations. We will also compare our proposed solutions to 
the current implementation and compare the results to other 
networks. One simple solution to increase the number of 
transactions per second would be to remove the maximum size 
of a block. This would increase the number of transactions per 
second the network would be able to compute, for example an 
increase to a 5MB block size would allow for 50 transactions 
per second. However, for this system to match EBay’s 23,148 
reputation transactions per second the block size would need to 
be 2.351GB causing the blockchain to increase in size by 
339GB a day; this is unstainable and shows that increasing the 
block size is not the solution.  
Fig 3 shows how the increased block size increases the 
number of transactions per second. 
Another method to increase the transactions per second, is to 
reduce the time required for each block to be mined. Currently 
the difficult of the proof of work is calculated such that a block 
is confirmed every ten minutes. This could be reduced to 5 
minutes, or even a single minute, to increase the transactions 
per second the network is able to process. 
Both methods of increasing the block size would 
increase the resources required by the user, such as more 
storage space to save the blockchain, as well as greater 
bandwidth to receive blocks at an increased rate. This would 
also further limit the participation of low-resourced nodes such 
as mobile devices. We therefore propose that each node is no 
longer required to download the entire blockchain, instead only 
the miners would be required to download and keep up to date 
the entire blockchain. This would change how reputations for 
users are calculated by the client; they would now be required 
to contact a pool of miners requesting the data for a specific 
user. A pool of miners will be used to prevent a malicious miner 
sending incorrect data to the requester, as in a pool, a majority 
of the miners would need to be malicious for this to occur.  
We calculated the probability of randomly selecting a 
malicious pool (where 50%+ of the pool is malicious) for 
varying amounts of network compromisation, in comparison to 
randomly selecting a single miner using the equation below. We 
then simulated this model in python before plotting the results 
on a graph as seen in Fig 4. 
 
𝜌(𝑚) = (
𝑘
𝑚
)𝑝𝑚(1 − 𝑝)𝑘−𝑚 
 
As shown in Fig 4, this method is very effective up to 40% 
of malicious nodes in the network, and effectively solves two 
limitations by allowing low-resourced users to join, as well as 
increasing the number of transactions per second. This 
demonstrates our proposed network is able to handle double the 
amount of malicious nodes supplying malicious reputation data 
as the reputation system proposed by Zhou [22] 
 
A. Analysis of results 
We have looked at the reputation system proposed and 
described some limitations faced during implementation. To 
ensure these limitations were mitigated, we developed a series 
of countermeasures to ensure the proposed network is as 
deployable as possible, in order for it to be successful.  
The solutions to the limitation issues have now improved 
the scalability of the network. The countermeasures proposed 
and simulated in this paper could be implemented into any 
blockchain based application which is having scalability issues.  
Changing the block confirmation time from ten minutes to 
five not only aids with scalability of the network, doubling the 
number of transactions that can be processed per second, it also 
increases security, as now a malicious peer would be able to be 
detected 50% faster than before. This increase in detection time 
was an unexpected benefit. 
There could however be negative impacts caused by our 
recommended changes to solve the limitation issues. The 
increased resources (storage space for the blockchain) on the 
miners could result in fewer miners on the network; this would 
in turn lower the security of the network, however the 
blockchain of the reputation system would still be significantly 
smaller than Bitcoin’s blockchain for at least the first two years 
of deployment, so we do not see this actually happening. 
Another perceived negative impact is the calculation time for a 
peer to calculate a user’s reputation will be higher, this is due 
to the peer now needing to request this data from a pool of 
miners. The network latency and processing of this request 
would add a small delay, but this would not be significant 
enough for the user to notice. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have discussed a next generation reputation 
system based on the blockchain, we have shown how a 
generalized reputation system that could be implemented into 
various networks is possible. We discuss in detail how the 
reputation system would be implemented and demonstrate how 
our proposed system solves many of the issues faced by current 
reputation systems. We conducted analysis on the limitations 
faced by our system before describing how these could be 
overcome. 
Overall, this paper aimed to propose a reputation system 
which solves the majority of issues faced in current reputation 
systems. However, this is just the foundation of the idea and 
there is a lot more research to be conducted in the future in 
various areas to ensure this reputation system is capable of 
replacing all reputation systems in the real world. 
VIII. FUTURE WORK 
This paper has shown how a reputation system could be 
easily implemented on a blockchain, and how our proposed 
reputation system theoretically solves the majority of issues 
faced by current generation systems. However, this is just the 
beginning of development of this network, and there are still 
many avenues of research left to pursue in this area. 
The most important piece of work to conduct in the future 
is to make this proposed network live. This will then let us 
examine in greater detail if the assumptions in this paper hold 
true on a real world.  
We cannot yet answer questions such as whether a user who 
acts honestly on one network can be assumed to act honestly on 
all networks they interact with, or when does past reputation for 
a user become irrelevant, but with more research we hope to be 
able to resolve these questions and more besides. 
The deployment onto a live network would also enable more 
accurate analysis of how users interact with the reputation 
system to allow a more accurate algorithm for calculating 
reputation scores to be refined.  
The deployment onto a real world network would also allow 
us to see if our solutions to known issues and limitations hold 
true, or if new issues surface. 
This paper has so far assumed a user does not worry about 
privacy, however there is a growing consensus that privacy is a 
critical factor in using any web application, so it would be a 
very interesting research area to consider if privacy can be 
implemented on a reputation system without succumbing to 
attacks which exploit the weak links between identity and users. 
We have focused on two applications for this system; an 
Ecommerce eBay type application where users can rate if they 
received the item, and also a peer-to-peer network, where users 
can rate each other peer if they have provided the correct file, 
in an attempt to detect any malicious nodes spreading malicious 
files through the network. It would be beneficial to the future 
success of this network if other implementations in these 
applications where possible. For example, instead of just rating 
a peer on whether it sent the correct file in a peer-to-peer 
network, could this system be adapted to bittorent and used to 
provide each client with the optimum download and upload 
speed, allowing each users to rate a series of other criteria to 
provide a better service to the client. 
The final area for future research is how to optimize the 
blockchain. Could pruning the blockchain be a possibility in 
this situation, this would allow the network to scale higher due 
to the lower resources needed. 
These are just some of the interesting research areas that we 
have yet to fully analyze, and with more research this project 
could be the next generation of reputation systems.   
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